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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2732 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
AMADU BARRY, 
Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-14-cr-00272-007) 
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on October 5, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 9, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Amadu Barry appeals an order of the District Court revoking his supervised 
release and imposing a sentence of incarceration followed by a new term of supervised 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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release.  He claims that the District Court committed procedural error at sentencing when 
it failed to consider that, per the Sentencing Guidelines, supervised release ordinarily is 
inappropriate for non-citizen defendants like Barry who are likely to be removed from the 
United States after release from incarceration.  See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c).  We will affirm.   
I. 
 Barry is a citizen of Liberia who, at all times relevant, was living in the United 
States as a lawful permanent resident.  In January 2015, he pleaded guilty to two counts 
of a superseding indictment charging him with credit card fraud, one count charging him 
with attempted credit card fraud, and one count charging him with conspiracy, all in 
violation of federal law.  The District Court imposed a sentence of time served, plus four 
concurrent, three-year terms of supervised release.  Conditions of Barry’s supervised 
release included that he refrain from committing new crimes and that he “report to the 
probation officer in a manner and frequency directed by the court or probation officer.”  
JA 3.   
Around seven months into his terms of supervised release, Barry was arrested in 
Delaware County, Pennsylvania, by local law enforcement for possession of marijuana 
and on suspicion of using fraudulent credit cards.  Soon after, Barry failed to report to his 
federal probation officer to discuss the new arrest.  Consequently, the probation officer 
lodged a petition with the District Court charging Barry with two violations of his 
supervised release.1  It conducted a hearing, at the close of which it sustained both 
                                              
1 In response, the District Court issued a bench warrant.  When the U.S. Marshals 
arrested Barry pursuant to that warrant, they found in his possession “prepaid visa cards 
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charges, revoked Barry’s supervised release, and imposed a Guidelines-range sentence of 
14 months of imprisonment, to be followed by a new, 20-month term of supervised 
release.2  Barry appealed.   
II.3 
Barry argues on appeal that it was “procedurally unreasonable” for the District 
Court to impose “a new term of supervised release in light of U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c).” 
Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 2.  Section 5D1.1(c) provides that a “court ordinarily should not 
impose a term of supervised release in a case in which supervised release is not required 
by statute and the defendant is a deportable alien who likely will be deported after 
imprisonment.”  The District Court did not address that presumption against supervised 
release, and Barry contends that the District Court thus contravened United States v. 
Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2017), which issued during the pendency of this 
appeal.  There we held that “a district court must ‘explain and justify’ the imposition of 
supervised release on a deportable immigrant”; while explicit citation of Section 5D1.1(c) 
                                              
with no names on them,” cash, and drugs. JA 29. 
 
2 At the hearing, Barry admitted that he did not report to the probation officer as 
directed, and there was essentially unrebutted testimony that Barry was, at the time of the 
underlying arrest, in possession of drugs and stolen or counterfeit access devices.  In 
addition, the probation officer testified that Barry had been prosecuted on similar charges 
in Chester County, Pennsylvania, and recently had failed to appear in court there on a 
suspected violation of state probation.   
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e).  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  
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is not required, the district court at a minimum must directly address the substance of that 
Guideline.  Id. at 153 (citation omitted).  
A determination that a district court committed procedural error at sentencing—
e.g., “failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence”—typically would result in a 
remand for resentencing.  Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d at 152.  But here the lone issue 
raised by Barry on appeal was not first presented to the District Court.  As a result, he 
must run the gauntlet of plain error review.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); cf. United States 
v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  “The plain error test 
requires (1) an error; (2) that is ‘clear or obvious’ and (3) ‘affected the defendant’s 
substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he or she must ‘show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the error,’ the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different.’”  Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d at 151 (citation omitted).  If that test is satisfied, 
we may correct the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings.”  Id.  
III. 
We agree with Barry that he was made to serve a new term of supervised release 
without an adequate explanation by the District Court of its divergence from the Section 
5D1.1(c) presumption.4  But even if that constituted clear or obvious error, cf. id. at 154, 
                                              
4 Section 5D1.1.(c), which was neither discussed by the parties at sentencing nor 
considered at all by the District Court, applies to Barry given his immigration status, 
criminal history, and other information available in the Presentence Investigation Report. 
In Azcona-Polanco, we observed that, “[i]n adopting Section 5D1.1(c), the Sentencing 
Commission noted that ‘recent changes in our immigration law have made removal 
nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders.” 865 F.3d at 152 
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we will affirm because Barry has failed to show that the error affected his substantial 
rights.  
The transcript of the revocation hearing reflects that, when it came time to fashion 
an appropriate sentence, the District Court was deeply concerned by Barry’s apparent 
inability to follow the law and the concomitant danger he posed to the community.  The 
District Court thus enumerated Barry’s “five prior adult convictions ranging from fraud, 
assault, retail theft and [unlawful] possession of access devices,” and emphasized the 
need to “protect the public” from Barry’s “further crimes” because he had “no respect for 
the law, absolutely none.” JA 40.  Such concerns are properly considered by a district 
court in the sentencing calculus, generally, and in deciding whether to impose a term of 
supervised release, specifically.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(C) and 3583(c).    
As we recognized in Azcona-Polanco, Section 5D1.1(c) advises against supervised 
release for a deportable-immigrant defendant in the ordinary case because post-
incarceration supervision will be “unnecessary”; that is, the defendant will be removed 
from the United States and, if he were to return without authorization, “the need to afford 
adequate deterrence and protect the public ordinarily is served by a new prosecution.” 
865 F.3d at 152 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), cmt. n.5).  That said, the commentary also 
provides that a district court should nonetheless consider imposing a term of supervised 
release on a deportable immigrant if doing so will provide “an added measure of 
deterrence and protection based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” 
                                              
(citation omitted).  Indeed, the Government advises that proceedings to remove Barry 
from the United States are underway.   
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U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), cmt. n.5.  Either way, the district court has discretion whether to 
follow Section 5D1.1(c).  See United States v. Dominguez-Alvarado, 695 F.3d 324, 329 
(5th Cir. 2012). 
Here the record reflects that, when the District Court sentenced Barry, he was not 
in removal proceedings or otherwise in the custody of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).  And no immigration detainer had been or was slated to be lodged such 
that the District Court could and should have predicted that Barry would be supervised by 
DHS immediately after serving his new term of incarceration.  That is significant because 
Barry at times could be evasive.  According to the probation officer, for example, 
multiple attempts to contact Barry after his arrest in Delaware County proved 
unsuccessful because his “cellular phone is no longer active and his father and girlfriend 
stated by telephone that they do not know his whereabouts.” JA 8; see also JA 40 
(District Court:  noting that Barry “disappeared . . . [and] did not appear at court 
hearings” after his release from incarceration).  Given those facts, along with the District 
Court’s stated desire to protect the public from Barry’s recidivism and the Guideline 
commentary discussed above, we discern no “reasonable probability” that the District 
Court would have declined to impose a term of supervised release even had it engaged 
with the substance of Section 5D1.1(c). 
*          *          * 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
